

23 MAR 1979

In September 1977 I sent you a letter expressing disappointment in the security programs of several firms engaged in major contracting activities funded or administered by the Central Intelligence Agency. I asked then for your help in bringing about higher standards of security throughout our joint industrial effort.

In the year and a half since then, I am happy to report, we have seen steady improvement in our industrial security programs and practices. As you are well aware, in the summer of 1977 I initiated a program of unannounced security audits of contractor activities associated with sensitive classified contracts. To date, a total of 70 such audits have been performed. The responses by corporate management to recommendations coming from these audits have been encouraging. This has led in turn to significant security enhancements in such fields as document control, courier programming and the physical security of the work areas.

I wish I could be as upbeat in reporting on security performance within the Government. The number of unauthorized leaks of highly classified information today is totally unacceptable. On a number of occasions I have said in public speeches that the greatest impediment to intelligence activities today is our inability to keep classified information out of the newspaper, let alone free from espionage.

In addition to the continuing problem of unauthorized leaks, I am sure you are well aware of the Kampiles case which took place within

CIA Headquarters and was a source of chagrin and distress to me. While Kampiles was assigned to the Agency in its Operations Center he stole a highly sensitive classified document and later sold it to Soviet agents. Kampiles was subsequently convicted on several counts involving espionage and is now in prison serving a 40-year sentence.

As a result of the Kampiles case and my general review of CIA security practices, we have taken a number of steps to tighten procedures: increasing the frequency of our repolygraph program; instituting regular rather than spot inspections of briefcases and packages being taken out of our buildings; reducing the number of classified documents on hand to the minimum required; reducing the number of people having access to codeword material by means of a zero-based review of all existing clearances; and generally enhancing attention to security consciousness.

I mention both my pleasure at the improvements in industrial security and my displeasure at the lapses in Government security to you because we must continue to work together to keep your security high and to improve ours. Two years ago I believed industrial security was below standards because of improper complacency; in recent months we have clearly faced the same phenomenon within the Government. Only if we work together and both insist on high standards of security consciousness can we prevent lapses in the future in either area.

I thank you for your attention and help, and express my appreciation for the recent security accomplishments in the industrial

sector. I am using them as a spur to achieve similar results in the Agency and the Intelligence Community. Finally, if you have any thoughts on how to improve security in either arena, please share them with me.

Yours sincerely,

STANSFIELD TURNER